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Abstract
We put forward a method for estimating discount rates using wealth and income
data. We build consumption from these data using the budget constraint. Consump-
tion transitions yield discount rates by household groups. Applying this technique to a
sample of older households, we find a similar distribution to those previously estimated
using field data, though with a much lower mean than those found using experiments.
Surprisingly, among this older population, patience is negatively correlated with ed-
ucation and numeracy. This goes against the positive correlation found for younger
populations in experiments and some field studies. We discuss potential explanations
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1 Introduction
In many situations individuals make decisions that involve a comparison of present and future
circumstances. They must decide how much to invest in education, how much to save for
retirement, how much to invest in health, etc. In each case these decisions are based on some
assessment of the potential welfare at different periods under different scenarios. Following
Samuelson (1937), economists have largely adopted a discounted-utility model which assumes
that preferences over time can be condensed into one major parameter, the geometric discount
rate (see Frederick et al. (2002) for a critical review and Hall (2010) for a review of recent
research developed using this approach).
To estimate discount rates, both field data and experiments are found in the literature.
Experimental studies are by far the most numerous. Amongst the 42 studies surveyed by
Frederick et al. (2002), 34 use experimental methods. A typical approach is for individuals
to be offered a menu of (real or hypothetical) choices between a quantity of money now and
a different quantity of money at some point in the future. Respondents’ choices are used to
estimate a discount rate.
Our paper fits into a much smaller literature that estimates discount rates using field
data on aspects of behaviour and a lifecycle model of consumption and saving. A typical
way to estimate preference parameters in such models, though not the one that we will take,
has been to solve numerically the intertemporal optimisation problem that the agents in a
particular population are assumed to face. Estimates of parameters such as the discount rate
are chosen such that the model’s predictions are close, in some metric and according to some
data, to those seen in reality. Such studies vary in the extent to which heterogeneity in the
discount factor is admitted into the model. Some papers assume homogenous discounting
behaviour, like French (2005) and Edwards (2013) where discounting is exponential and
Laibson et al. (2007) where discounting is quasi-hyperbolic. More flexibility was allowed by
Attanasio et al. (1999) who estimate a version of the lifecycle model where the discount rate
varies stochastically with the composition of the household while even more is allowed by
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Samwick (1998) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) who estimate a different discount rate
for every household.
These papers fully specify a lifecycle model and solve it. The method we employ does not
do this but rather uses the first-order condition to that solution – the Euler equation. We first
generate longitudinal observations on consumption using a procedure introduced by Ziliak
(1998) and Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003). This involves calculating consumption using
comprehensive and high quality data on assets and income and the intertemporal budget
constraint. Our resulting distribution of consumption is shown to be remarkably similar
to that derived from the UK’s household budget survey. Using the Euler equation and
consumption transitions at the household level we estimate average discount rates for groups
of households. Such an approach has typically been precluded in the past by the absence of
good quality panel data on consumption – a problem discussed in detail by Browning et al.
(2003).
Our approach has some parallels with papers that have previously relied on the Euler
equation to estimate parameters, in particular the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Estimation in this manner was carried out by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Attanasio
and Weber (1995) among others. For a lively criticism of this approach see Carroll (2001)
and for a defense see Attanasio and Low (2004). Our approach differs from these papers
in three principal ways. First, we are able to use consumption transitions at the household
level rather than relying on aggregate or cohort-level data. Second, our use of household
rather than cohort level consumption data allows us to use the exact Euler equation in our
estimation, rather than relying on Taylor series approximations. Third, we do not assume
that the discount rate is the same for each individual in our sample, nor do we assume that
it is unchanging across the lifecycle.
We apply the procedure outlined above to a representative sample of older English house-
holds using the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA). We show, unsurprisingly,
that there is substantial heterogeneity in discounting in that population. The typical levels
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of discount rates that we estimate are of similar magnitude to those estimated in other papers
based on the lifecycle model of consumption and saving. These rates imply substantially less
discounting than is implied by the results of experimental studies.
Our most surprising result is that discount rates tends to rise with education and levels
of numerical ability (i.e. those with less education and those who are less numerically able
tend to be the most patient). This result is contrary to that found in the literature that
measures the extent to which individuals discount future income streams (see for instance
Warner and Pleeter (2001), Harrison et al. (2002), and Dohmen et al. (2010)). These papers
differ in their empirical approach – the first uses data on the choices of departing military
personnel over whether they will take their severance payment in a lump-sum or in the
form of an annuity payment, while the second and third papers use laboratory experiments.
The literature using field data offers less conclusive evidence. Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
solve a lifecycle model and estimate discount rates by matching simulated consumption data
to those observed in the data at different ages and, similar to us, finds that people with
more education are less patient. On the contrary, Cagetti (2003), implementing a broadly
similar procedure as that used by Gourinchas and Parker, but using data on assets instead
of consumption, finds evidence suggesting the more educated are more patient. This is also
found by Lawrance (1991), using an approach based on a log-linearised Euler equation and
data on transitions in food expenditure.
We discuss our somewhat puzzling result below and raise the possibility that prior ev-
idence, driven largely by choices individuals made at younger ages is not applicable to the
discounting between periods at older ages.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Our empirical approach is outlined in
Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the data and explain how we calculate consumption from
assets and income. Results are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Theory and empirical approach
In our estimation of discount rates, we start from a standard life-cycle model in which each
household (as a collective unit) maximises expected discounted utility by choosing their
consumption and their holdings of each of J different asset or debt instruments each period.
In period t, household i faces the following optimisation problem:
max
{Xjis,cis}Ts=t
u(cit) +
T∑
τ=t+1
(
τ−t∏
s=1
1
1 + ρi(t+s)
)
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[
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(ii) Xji(τ+1) ≥ bji(τ+1) ∀ τ, j (2)
where ρit is the discount rate for household i between period t and t + 1. Equation (1) is
the budget constraint at date τ and equation (2) represents a borrowing constraint for asset
j: bj is the minimum level of that asset that must be held. This will be negative for debt
instruments that households have access to and zero for non-debt instruments.1 The other
quantities in the model are consumption (ct), holdings of each of J assets (X
j
t ) which are
negative in the case of debts, the nominal income yield of asset j (rjt ), the price of asset j
(pjt), labour income (et), income from transfers (dt) and the price of consumption (pt). We
make the standard assumption that the instantaneous utility function u(.) is invariant over
time.
An Euler equation (first order condition) is satisfied for every asset that households can
potentially hold (see for example Campbell 2000). That is, for each asset j, and for each pair
of consecutive periods t and t+ 1, the following inequality holds:
1Alternatively, we could specify a liquidity constraint that ensures that total debts are no greater than a
certain quantity.
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du(cit)
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(3)
The Euler equation holds at equality for household i as long as the sales of asset j are not
constrained (i.e. as long as Xjit+1 > b
j
it+1). In particular, the consumption of households who
hold positive cash balances satisfies (where 0 indexes cash):
du(cit)
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=
1
(1 + ρi(t+1))
E
[
(1 + r0t+1)
pt
p(t+1)
du(ci(t+1))
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(4)
All features of the model other than the instantaneous utility function are allowed to vary
freely over time – in particular we do not assume that the discount rate is time-invariant.
We specify the utility function as taking the familiar isoelastic form:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ (5)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Assuming that constraints on cash holdings
do not bind, the discount rate is given by (suppressing i subscripts):
ρt+1 = E
[
(1 + r0t+1)
pt
pt+1
(
ct
ct+1
)γ]
− 1. (6)
This equation forms the basis for our empirical approach. We group households according
to particular characteristics (such as their education level, numerical ability, age and marital
status) and estimate the expectation in the equation above by using the sample average of
the quantity in square brackets among households of a particular group. In using the sample
average to estimate the expectation term we need to assume that there are no differential
shocks across households that lead to systematic differences in the term pt
pt+1
(
ct
ct+1
)γ
.
It is worth pointing out how the change in consumption (the central observable quantity
that enters the Euler equation) identifies the discount rate. The faster is consumption growth,
all else being equal, the lower is the discount rate (that is, the more patient is the individual
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concerned). Households who are patient tend to forsake current consumption for future
consumption – and therefore exhibit consumption growth. The converse is also true. Those
who are impatient tend to prefer current consumption to future consumption. They therefore
have lower (or even negative) consumption growth.
To bring equation (6) to the data, we need to specify an interest rate on cash and a
coefficient of relative risk aversion. We now discuss each of these in turn. Figure 1 shows the
nominal pre-tax rate of return on two types of cash assets in the UK between 2002 and 2009
– instant access savings and time deposits. Until the large fall in the last quarter of 2008,
interest rates were relatively stable, moving within a range of approximately a percentage
point. In our estimation we use a nominal pre-tax interest rate of 3% – approximately the
average rate of return on time deposits over the period. Our headline results refer to the
consumption changes over the period 2004 to 2006 and will therefore be unaffected by the
large fall in interest rates in 2008. With some exceptions, interest is taxable in the UK and
we convert this pre-tax interest rate to a post-tax interest rate using the marginal rate of
tax faced by each household in a particular year. For couples whose members face different
marginal tax rates, we use the lower of the two rates, on the basis that efficient tax-planning
in most cases will allow the couple to pay that lower rate of tax on their asset income.
We cannot identify the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ in equation (6)) and we
assume that is does not vary across individuals. The assumption of a coefficient of relative
risk aversion that doesn’t vary across households is a strong one (Outreville (2015) surveys
the empirical literature which has shown differences in risk aversion exist by education group).
However our data does not contain sufficient individual variation in interest rates to warrant
identification. We set γ equal to 1.25. This is consistent with the range of elasticities
of intertemporal substitution estimated by Attanasio and Weber (1993) on UK data and
very close to that obtained by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). We have generated results
assuming alternative values of γ. While the mean discount rates are sensitive to these values,
the ranking of households’ discount rates is the same for all positive choices of γ that are
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Figure 1: Nominal pre-tax rate of return on cash in the UK – 2002 to 2009.
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constant across households.
Finally it is worth making explicit two restrictions implicit in the use of equation (6).
These relate to liquidity constraints and changes in the utility function due to changing
household composition or changing labour supply.
First, recall that the Euler equation (6) only holds at equality when individuals are
not liquidity constrained. If we use equation (6) to estimate the discount rate for a group
containing liquidity constrained individuals, the estimate will be biased downwards. Concerns
about the presence of liquidity constraints in our case are mitigated by the fact that we work
on a population over the age of 50, at a point in the lifecycle where most have accumulated
some liquid wealth – almost 95% of our sample have positive gross liquid asset holdings. As
a check that our results are not being driven by liquidity constraints we have confirmed that
there are no substantial changes in focussing only on those with liquid assets above a certain
minimum level (see Section 5).
Second, when individuals leave or join a household between periods, the assumption of a
constant instantaneous utility function at dates t and t+1 does not make sense; we therefore
do not include households whose composition changes between waves of data. Further, as
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evidence points to changes in consumption patterns around retirement (Banks et al. (1998),
Wakabayashi (2008)) we exclude from our sample households where some member left the
labour market during the period covered by our data.
The previous two paragraphs have outlined two exclusions from our estimating sample.
Some further exclusions are necessary due to the fact that we are not able to calculate
consumption satisfactorily for every household in our sample. The extent of these exclusions
is outlined in the Appendix. To deal with the fact that those omitted are unlikely to be a
random sub-sample of our overall sample, we generate weights representing the probability
of each household being included in our sample and, in our results we attach a weight to each
household of the inverse of this probability. These probabilities are estimated as functions
of marital status, education, age, income quintile and wealth quintile. Our results will,
therefore, be representative of the entire population aged 50 and over if the selection into our
sample can be adequately modelled as a function of these characteristics.
3 Data
Our data come from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a panel
survey that is representative of the English population aged 50 and over. It started in
2002, and individuals have been re-interviewed every two years since then - our main results
use data from the first three waves. The purpose and form of the survey is similar to
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US and the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 20 European countries. The first wave was conducted
between April 2002 and March 2003 and sampled 12,099 individuals (of whom 11,391 were
core sample members; the remainder were individuals aged under 50 who were the partners
of core sample members). There are 7,894 benefit units (i.e. a single person or couple along
with any dependent children) where each member of the couple is a sample member. Our
sample is drawn from these benefit units.
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While ELSA contains questions on some components of expenditure (food, domestic fuel
and clothing) it does not, unfortunately, contain data on total expenditure, which, approxi-
mating consumption, is needed to estimate the discount rate. In fact there is no nationally-
representative longitudinal survey that collects total expenditure in the UK and such data is
rare internationally.2 This lack of comprehensive longitudinal data on expenditure has proved
something of an obstacle to bringing Euler equations to data. The literature has either relied
on aggregate data, or, following Browning et al. (1985), has used repeated cross-sections to
form a quasi-panel of birth cohort-level average expenditure. An alternative approach was
suggested by Skinner (1987) and refined by Blundell et al. (2008). It involves estimating the
relationship between food (and possibly other items of) expenditure and total expenditure
using a household budget survey. As general-purpose panel surveys often contain data on
food expenditure this estimated relationship can be used to impute total expenditure.
We proceed in a different manner: following Ziliak (1998) and Browning and Leth-
Petersen (2003), we use the rich data on income and assets that is contained in ELSA
to back out expenditure from the intertemporal budget constraint. In all the following, we
will equate total expenditure (excluding mortgage repayments) with consumption. The rest
of this section summarises this procedure – further details are given in the Appendix – and
shows a close correspondence between features of the resulting distribution of consumption
with those that are obtained using the UK’s Household Budget Survey.
3.1 Calculating consumption using longitudinal data on assets and
income
We use longitudinal data on assets and income along with the budget constraint to calcu-
late consumption between two waves. Equation (1) can be re-arranged to get the value of
consumption in period t as follows:
2A notable exception to this is the Spanish ‘Encuesta continua de presupuesto familiares’, a diary-based
longitudinal survey of expenditure. The Panel Study of Income and Dynamics in the US, since 1999, has
collected expenditure data that covers approximately 70% of average total expenditure.
10
ptct = et + dt +
∑
j
rjtp
j
tX
j
t +
∑
j
(
pjtX
j
t − pjt+1Xjt+1
)
(7)
The timing convention and how it relates to the data deserves some discussion. In ELSA,
interviews take place approximately every two years. So to be precise:
• Flow variables representing consumption ct, non-capital income et, transfers dt and the
asset yield, including any capital gain or loss, rjt , are measured over the entire two year
period;
• Stock variables Xjt represent holdings of assets at the beginning of the period (i.e. at
the time of the first interview); Xjt+1 represents asset holdings at the beginning of period
t+ 1 or equivalently at the end of period t (i.e. at the time of the next interview);
• Asset prices pjt and pjt+1 represent asset prices at the time of the first and second
interview;
• The overall price level pt represents the average price level in the period between the
two interviews.
Equation (7) is the equation that we use to calculate consumption between two waves of
the survey. Having calculated consumption in this manner we make one further adjustment
and subtract mortgage repayments (both capital components and interest) from the resulting
quantity. While these represent cash expenditure on housing, they are not generally indicative
of consumption of the flow of housing services.
Equation (7) can be rewritten as:
ptct = et + dt +
∑
j
(
qjt +
pjt+1 − pjt
pjt
)
pjtX
j
t +
∑
j
(
pjtX
j
t − pjt+1Xjt+1
)
(8)
where the rate of return on asset j, rjt has been written as the sum of the income yield q
j
t
and the capital gain
pjt+1−pjt
pjt
earned during period t.
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Some, but not all of the quantities on the right-hand-side of equation (8) can be directly
read from the ELSA data. In each wave the value of each asset held (pjXj) is recorded, as are
non-capital income (e), capital income (qjpjXj) and lump-sum transfers (d) in the period
prior to the interview (where ‘period’ in the case of most forms of income and transfers
represents 12 months). ELSA respondents are asked for details on 16 different financial asset
and (non-mortgage) debt instruments.3 These include various type of savings products, bond
holdings and equity holdings. See section A.1.1 in the Appendix for more detail and Table
10 in that section for summary statistics on holdings in each asset.
Our data does not record capital gains on assets held between the two waves (
pjt+1−pjt
pjt
), nor
does it contain data on income and transfers for a period of approximately one year (recall
that ELSA sample members are surveyed approximately every two years) - two objects that
appear in equation (8). The majority of assets held by the population in our sample are in
safe forms – so there is no capital gain to be considered for these assets. For equity holdings
we assume a capital gain (or loss) in line with the change in the FTSE index between the
two interview dates. Estimating income in the missing year is facilitated by exploiting the
longitudinal aspect of the survey data – we interpolate linearly between income in year y and
income in year y+2 to obtain income in year y+1. Finally, we assume that there are no lump-
sum transfers in the missing year and we exclude from our sample those households where it
is likely that some member received a lump-sum transfer (due to retirement, redundancy or
the death of a spouse or parent). We give further details about all of these assumptions and
their implications in the Appendix.
3.2 Comparing consumption in ELSA and in the EFS
In this section, we compare the distribution of consumption estimated in the manner de-
scribed above with that estimated using the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS).4 The EFS
3There are also questions on housing wealth, physical wealth and pension wealth.
4This survey has, since 2008, been known as the Living Costs and Food Survey. However, the data that
we show is from years prior to this, so we make use of the older name.
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is the UK’s household budget survey, and is used to calculate the commodity-weights of
the UK’s inflation indices (the Consumer Prices Index and the Retail Prices Index). The
data is collected annually, throughout the year and the survey is designed to be nationally-
representative. Respondents are asked to record all purchases over a two week period in a
diary and also to complete a questionnaire that seeks information on infrequently-purchased
items. The combination of the diary and the questionnaire allows a comprehensive measure
of consumption to be calculated.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function and the probability density function
of total consumption in both surveys. The data shown is for calendar year 2003 for the EFS
and for (annualised) calculated consumption between the surveys in 2002/03 and 2004/05
for ELSA. The EFS functions are estimated using only those households where the head is
aged over 50 so that both samples are drawn from populations with the same age profile.
Both distributions are shown net of mortgage repayments. As mentioned at the end of
Section 1 and discussed in the Appendix, to compute the distribution of consumption in
ELSA we weight each observation by the inverse of the probability of being able to calculate
consumption. In both surveys we trim the most extreme values – showing the middle 80%
of the distribution.
Figure 2 shows that there is a close correspondence between the distributions in both
shape and location. The correspondence is closest at the bottom of the distribution (i.e.
up to annual consumption of £10,000). At this point, the distributions diverge somewhat –
with the distribution of consumption in ELSA lying to the right of that in the EFS. This
divergence, which represents a tendency for consumption to be greater in ELSA than the
EFS in the upper half of the distribution is consistent with the fact that consumption in
the EFS (grossed up to national levels) is known to under-record the level of consumption
calculated as part of the National Accounts with the degree of under-reporting thought to
be greater for those who have higher levels of consumption (see Brewer and O’Dea, 2012).
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Figure 2: CDF and PDF of consumption in EFS and ELSA – 2003.
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3.3 Summary statistics
We noted at end of the last section (and give more detail in Appendix A.4.1) that some
households are omitted from the sample (for example, because the data on their asset holdings
had to be imputed and therefore we are not confident in the quality of our consumption data).
Table 1 gives summary statistics, both for the full ELSA sample and our sample. Panel (A)
gives proportions in categories of age, education, numerical ability and marital status: these
are the variables which we use to group households in estimating discount rates (equation
6)5. Panel (B) gives means and selected percentiles of the distribution of annual income, net
liquid wealth and net housing wealth. Comparisons between the two sets of statistics shows
that there is a close correspondence between the characteristics of our sample and the full
5Those who didn’t complete UK school leaving exams (typically taken at the age of 18) have ‘low’ educa-
tion, those who completed these but have no third-level education are in the ‘middle’ education group, and
those with any post-schoolqualification are in the ‘high’ education group. Numerical ability is tested using six
questions in ELSA - our categorisation follows that in Banks et al. (2010). Marital status is defined covering
the first four waves of ELSA - those whose status changed are in the ‘other’ group. The age, education and
numerical ability of the couple are taken as that of the older/more educated/more numerically-able of the
couples. More details on the education and numerical ability characteristics are given in Appendix A.1.2.
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ELSA sample - with the exception that our sample under-represents those with the highest
liquid wealth holdings.
Table 1: Summary statistics
(A) (B)
All Our All Our
Households sample Households sample
Age groups (props.) Annual income (£1000s)
50-59 34.45 34.13 Mean 17.01 17.14
60-69 26.78 25.29 p10 5.08 5.14
70-79 23.84 23.95 p25 7.58 7.70
80+ 14.93 16.63 p50 12.69 13.30
Total 100.00 100.00 p75 21.10 21.58
p90 32.36 31.09
Education (props.) Net liquid wealth (£1000s)
Low 54.70 54.65 Mean 73.28 45.00
Middle 28.57 28.24 p10 0.00 0.00
High 16.66 17.10 p25 1.61 2.00
Total 100.00 100.00 p50 13.50 11.52
p75 61.55 51.60
p90 169.00 121.36
Numerical Ability (props.) Net housing wealth (£1000s)
1 (Lowest) 11.89 9.73 Mean 114.11 117.03
2 41.22 40.97 p10 0.00 0.00
3 29.95 32.53 p25 0.00 20.00
4 (Highest) 15.47 16.07 p50 90.00 95.00
Missing 1.47 0.70 p75 161.00 175.00
Total 100.00 100.00 p90 250.00 260.00
Marital status (props.) Sample size
Single 7.19 8.42 7,894 1,504
Marr/cohab 52.08 54.32
Widowed 24.12 26.23
Sep/Div 10.48 11.03
Other 6.15 0.00
4 Results
We first summarise the distribution of the quantities represented by the right-hand side of
equation (6):
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[
(1 + r0t+1)
pt
pt+1
(
ct
ct+1
)γ]
− 1 (9)
This quantity would be equal to the discount rate if ct+1 and pt+1 were perfectly forecasted
by households at date t. Our presentation of the distribution of this quantity which we refer
to below as the ‘ex-post’ discount rate is a useful preliminary step.
Our use of four waves of ELSA data gives us up to three observations on consumption
for each household and therefore up to two observations on the ex-post discount rate. Figure
3 shows two distributions of the ex-post discount rates (trimming the bottom 10% and top
10% of the sample). The median discount rate is approximately -3% in the earlier period and
is 0% in the later period. These median ex-post discount rates are low relative to estimates
of the discount rate found in the literature that estimate such rates using field data and very
low relative to those found in the experimental literature.
Figure 3: Distribution of ex-post discount rates – 2004/06, 2006/08 and aver-
age.
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Figure 3 shows substantial heterogeneity around these medians. This depicts the distri-
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bution of the discount rate, perturbed by two phenomena. First, realisations of stochastic
variables will differ from their expectations. Second, our consumption data is likely to in-
clude some measurement error. Figure 3 also shows the distribution of the geometric mean
of our two successive observations on the discount rate. The variance of this distribution is
substantially smaller than the variance of either cross-sectional distribution. This could be
due to some combination of averaging over time of the discount rate for each family and to
a diminished effect of measurement error once we take a time average.
We are aware of three papers that, using field data and the lifecycle model, have estimated
the entire distribution of discount rates: Alan and Browning (2010), Samwick (1998) and
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) (hereafter GS). In Table 2 we compare our three distributions
of the ex-post discount rate (the two cross-sectional distributions, and the distribution of their
geometric average) to those found in the last two of these using a breakdown reported in GS.6
It is important to note, though, that we would not necessarily expect a close correspondence
between our results and theirs as the populations on which the estimates are based are very
different. Our results are for English households containing an individual aged over 50, while
the results of both Samwick and GS are estimated on samples of US working-age adults.
Table 2: Comparison of our results with those of Samwick (1998) and Gustmann & Steinmeier
(2005)
Discount Samwick GS Ours Ours Ours
rate 04-06 06-08 Ave
<5% 38% 40% 60% 56% 67%
5%-10% 25% 21% 5% 6% 9%
10%-15% 10% 6% 5% 6% 7%
>15% 25% 33% 30% 32% 17%
Notes: These groups are those reported in Gustman and Steinmeier’s Table 2. That table doesn’t show the
proportion with negative estimated discount rates. Our three estimated distributions have proportions with
negative estimated discount rates of 53%, 48% and 56% respectively.
6These results are not directly comparable with those in Alan and Browning (2010) where the distributions
are presented graphically. Additionally, that paper discusses how their results relate to those in Samwick
(1998). Alan and Browning (2010) restrict the discount rate to be greater than 0. We find, as do GS and
Samwick, evidence of households with negative discount rates.
17
The most striking difference between our results and those of Samwick and GS is the
substantial number of households that we find with ex-post discount rates of less than 5%. We
find approximately 60% here in this portion of the distribution compared to approximately
40% in the distribution of discount rates in the two papers based on the US all-age population.
We find a larger share of households with negative ex-post discount rates (approximately 50%
of the sample). This compares to approximately 10% of those in Samwick’s sample (see his
Figure 3; note GS do not report the proportion with negative discount rates).
In our two cross-sectional distributions, we find a similar share of households in the right
tail of the distribution (those with a discount rate greater than 15%) as do Samwick and GS,
and find less mass in the region of 5% to 15%. On our average measure, the mass in the
left tail of our distribution increases, largely at the expense, relative to either cross-sectional
distribution, of that in the right tail.
The models of both Samwick and GS assume a discount rate for a particular household
that does not change over time. If discount rates do vary over time, their estimates represent
some average of the lifetime sequence of discount rates. Therefore, the large mass that we
find in the left tail of the distribution could be reconciled with the estimates of Samwick and
GS if households have higher discount rates at younger ages than at older ages (at which
point they enter our population of interest).
Table 3 gives estimates of the median ex-post discount rate (ρˆ) and associated standard
errors of the medians (σ), for groups defined according to age, marital status, education,
numerical ability (we discuss how these last two variables are constructed in Appendix A).
No clear relationship with age is evident7 while the evidence is suggestive that, if anything,
those who are widowed or divorced are more patient in this period than those who are single
and never married and those who are married. Surprisingly, we find that less educated
families and families with lower levels of numerical ability tend to be more patient than
7While we refer to (the absence of) a relationship with age, we are not able to separately identify asso-
ciations of discount factors with each of age and cohort. Exploiting a longer panel than we have access to
would allow us to separately identify age and cohort effects if we assumed that there were no time effects in
discount rates.
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those with more education and greater levels of numerical ability respectively (though the
differences are less pronounced in the latter case).
Table 3: Median ex-post discount rate by household characteristics.
Marital Numerical
Age ρˆ σ Status ρˆ σ Education ρˆ σ ability ρˆ σ
50-59 -2.2 2.4 Single 0.1 5.3 Low -3.2 1.0 1 (Low) -2.9 2.0
60-69 -4.6 1.9 Married -2.1 2.1 Mid. -1.8 2.1 2 -3.2 1.1
70-79 -2.5 1.4 Widowed -3.1 1.7 High 6.5 5.6 3 -0.8 2.7
80+ 0.5 2.5 Sep./Div. -4.8 2.1 4 (High) -1.3 4.0
All -2.3 1.0 All -2.3 1.0 All -2.3 1.0 All -2.3 1.0
Notes: The number of households in each of the age groups are: 350, 432, 492 and 229. The number of
households in each of the marital status groups are: 133, 619, 510 and 241. The number of households in
each of the education groups are: 942, 396 and 165. The number of households in each of the four numeracy
groups are: 189, 699, 431 and 174. The median in the ‘All’ row differs slightly between columns as the
number of households in each differs. In calculating the ‘All’ group median we exclude those with missing
values of the covariate in question.
We use a grouping estimator to estimate the average ex-ante discount rate for groups
defined by age, marital status, levels of education and numerical ability. The estimator is
based on equation (6). It estimates the expectation in that equation by its sample analogue
for a particular group and weights the results to account for possibly non-random selection
into our sample. For each group we trim the sample, removing those in the first and tenth
decile of consumption growth. Unlike Alan and Browning (2010) we do not explicitly account
for the role of measurement error. However, our approach does not involve assuming (as does
the vast majority of work in this area) that preference parameters remain the same over the
whole of the lifecycle.
Table 4 summarises these results. The results mirror those presented above in Table 3 –
no clear relationship with age; widows and those who are divorced appearing more patient
than those who are otherwise single and those who are married; and evidence that discount
rates increase with education and numerical ability.
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Table 4: Mean ex-ante discount rate by household characteristics
Marital Numerical
Age ρˆ σ Status ρˆ σ Education ρ¯ σ ability ρ¯ σ
50-59 -0.0 1.4 Single 1.2 2.2 Low -2.6 0.7 1 (Low) -2.9 1.4
60-69 -1.8 1.2 Married 2.0 1.2 Mid. 0.8 1.4 2 -2.4 0.8
70-79 -0.7 1.1 Widowed -3.2 1.0 High 6.7 3.0 3 1.6 1.5
80+ -0.5 1.7 Sep/Div -3.8 1.2 4 (High) 2.3 2.4
All -0.9 0.6 All -0.9 0.6 All -0.9 0.6 All -1.0 0.6
Notes: The sample sizes in each category are smaller here than in Tables 3 as, in each category we trim the
top and bottom 10% of values. The number of households in each of the age groups are: 280, 343, 392 and
183. The number of households in each of the marital status groups are: 107, 499, 408 and 193. The number
of households in each of the education groups are: 749, 319 and 133. The number of households in each of
the four numeracy groups are: 153, 561, 345 and 140. The mean in the ‘All’ row differs slightly between
columns as the number of households in each differs. In calculating the ‘All’ group median we exclude those
with missing values of the covariate in question.
The magnitude of the differences between the education groups is large.8 For example,
the difference between the point estimates of the mean discount rate for the ‘low’ education
group and those in the ‘high’ education group is over 9 percentage points. This means that,
over this period and in this population, if those with the most education are to exhibit the
same saving behaviour at the margin as those with the least, the former group will require a
safe return of 9 percentage points greater than the latter group.
Table 5 investigates the joint association between average discount rates, education and
numerical ability. Here those in numeracy groups 1 and 2 are categorised as having ‘low’
numerical ability and those in numeracy groups 3 and 4 are categorised as having ‘high’
numerical ability. The ‘low’ education group is defined as before, while the ‘med./high’
education group contains the upper two categories. The gradient of the association between
education and average discount rate, conditional on level of numerical ability is particularly
large. Among those with low levels of numerical ability, the average discount rates of the low
education group is estimated at -3.1%, compared to 1.0% for those in the mid./high education
group. For those with more numerical ability, the differences according to education are
8The differences are also statistically significant. The difference between the mean discount rates of the
low and middle education groups are significant at the 5% level and those between the high and low education
group are significant at the 1% level.
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starker – with average discount rates of -1.5% and 4.6% for those with less and more education
respectively.
Table 5: Mean ex-ante discount rate for groups defined by pairwise combinations of both
education and numerical ability
Low education Med./High education
Low numeracy -3.1 1.0
(0.8) (1.8)
High numeracy -1.5 4.6
(1.5) (1.9)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6 explores the robustness of our most puzzling result - the fact that estimated mean
discount rates are higher for those with more education than those with less. Column 1 is
associated with less trimming than in our headline results. We trim those in the bottom and
top 5% of the distribution of consumption growth instead of those in the bottom and top
10%. Columns 2 and 3 apply successively stricter sample selection rules than are applied in
our baseline sample. These are the ‘middle’ and ‘strict’ sample selection rules outlined in
Appendix A.4. In the first two cases the results that we previously emphasised still hold –
the estimated mean discount rates are higher for those with more education than those with
less. In columns 2 and 3, as the sample becomes more restricted and smaller, the gradients
are less clearly monotonic and the standard errors are larger.
Table 6: Sensitivity of mean ex-ante discount rate for groups defined according to education
(1) (2) (3)
Education ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ
Low -1.0 0.9 -1.5 0.9 -0.6 1.3
Mid. 3.9 1.8 2.7 1.8 3.0 2.6
High 10.5 3.6 3.9 4.2 -0.3 6.8
All 2.1 0.8 -0.5 0.8 -0.3 1.2
The total sample size is 1,355 in column (1), 776 in column (2) and 305 in column (3).
We might want to confirm that our relatively small sample, combined with our trimming
of the largest 10% increases in consumption and largest 10% decreases in consumption does
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not materially affect our results. To investigate this, we solve and simulate behaviour from
a simple life-cycle model. We specify a life-cycle model where agents make a consumption
and saving choice every year from the age of 20 to 100. In each period until the age of 65
they receive income which follows an autoregressive process with autocorrelation of 0.95 and
variance of 0.02. We specify that there are equal numbers of ten types of agents, each with
a different discount rate. Discount rates range from -2.5% to 7.5% with a mean of 2.5%.
After solving (using a backwards recursion) for the set of consumption functions, we carry
out the following procedure 499 times. First, we draw a sample of 200 agents (20 from each
discount rate type). Second, we simulate their consumption behaviour using the calculated
consumption functions. Third, we take one consumption transition between two sequential
years for each individual. The age for the transition is chosen as a random age between 50
and 80; this age differs for each individual. We then trim the largest and smallest 10% of
consumption transitions and estimate a discount rate (just as we do in our estimation). The
mean (across 499 simulations) estimated discount rate is 2.37% with a 95% confidence interval
of [2.16%, 2.59%] which contains the truth. This simulation reassures us that estimation of
the discount rate in sample sizes of the type that we have is possible with reasonable precision.
5 A puzzling result?
Our results are puzzling in light of the studies, particularly those using experimental designs,
that find that low educated individuals tend to lack patience compared to higher educated.
A primary difference between this paper and most of the rest of the literature is the fact
that results in the latter come from samples of individuals who tend to be much younger
than ours. Work using lifecycle models (e.g. Samwick (1998) and Gustman and Steinmeier
(2005)) typically focusses on working age individuals while the experimental literature often
uses samples of students. In contrast, our sample comprises older households in England,
aged 50 and above. Frederick et al. (2002) noted at that time that “no studies [had] been
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conducted to permit any conclusions about the temporal stability of time preferences” and,
while Bishai (2004) does investigate how time preference changes over the age range 14 to
37, we are not aware of any studies that look at the discounting behaviour of the oldest
households. We now briefly consider some other explanation for our results.
First, consider survival probabilities. Households in the model discount the future for
two reasons – first their ‘pure’ rate of time preference, and second their expectation of being
alive at each period in the future. Differential survival probabilities could explain our result
on education in the following manner. Suppose that all education groups had the same mean
‘pure’ discount rate, but that one group had a longer life-expectancy. This group would
appear to be more patient. A negative correlation between education and life expectancy
could explain, at least some of, our results. In our data, however, it is those with lower
education levels that tend to have shorter life expectancies. ELSA respondents are asked
the following question: “What are the chances that you will live to be X or more?”, where
X depends on their current age. We run a simple linear regression of the responses to this
question on dummies for our education groups and age dummies (the latter to account for the
possibility that those in different education groups are distributed differently across ages).
We find that those in the middle education consider themselves to be 3.1 percentage points
more likely to live to the age referenced in the question than those in the low education group,
and those in the high education group are 5.4 percentage points more likely. Differential life
expectancies, therefore, would seem to work in the opposite direction from our puzzle.
Second, if it were the case that those with more education had access to higher pre-tax
safe rates of return, then our assumption that everyone has the same pre-tax rate of return
would generate a downward bias in the estimates of discount rates for the more educated
relative to the less. That those with more education might face (through greater financial
literacy) higher rates of return is plausible. This would render our result a conservative one
- and the actual gap between the discount rate of those with less and more education could
be greater than that which we find.
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Third, liquidity constraints might be important. Recall that for any household that is
liquidity constrained, the Euler equation (which forms the basis for our estimating equation
(6)), will hold with an inequality rather than an equality. Our sample is comprised of those
over the age of 50 who are substantially less likely to be liquidity constrained than those
earlier in their lifecycle; Table 10 in the appendix shows that 93% of our sample have positive
holdings of gross liquid assets. To investigate a potential differential incidence of liquidity
constraints between those with different levels of education and numerical ability, we show
results for samples restricted to those with holdings of at least £2,500, £5,000 and £10,000 of
gross liquid assets respectively. Table 7 shows the results for these sub-samples for our groups
defined by education. The gradient of interest – that patience is decreasing in education –
is apparent in each of the sub-samples. While the populations represented by each of these
sub-samples differ in important ways (because, for example, wealth is endogenous to the
discount rate) we interpret these results as strongly suggestive that liquidity constraints are
not driving our headline associations between discount rates and education.
Table 7: Mean ex-ante discount rate for groups defined according to education and level of
positive gross liquid assets
Level of positive liquid gross assets
Base ≥ 2,500 ≥ 5,000 ≥ 10,000
Education ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ
Low -2.6 0.7 -5.2 1.0 -5.3 1.3 -5.2 1.8
Mid. 0.8 1.4 -0.2 1.8 -0.4 2.1 -1.9 2.4
High 6.7 3.0 8.0 3.4 8.7 3.4 6.9 3.6
All -0.9 0.6 -2.4 0.9 -1.0 1.1 -1.2 1.4
The total sample size is 1,200 in the base category, 818 in the sample of those with over £2,500, 641 in the
sample with over £5,000 and 497 in the sample with over £10,000.
A fourth consideration is the possible incidence of non-insured shocks that differ system-
atically between the groups we examine. The effect of these will not be removed from the
grouping estimator that we implement. The ELSA data allows us to indirectly assess whether
these may be important. There is a question which asks “What are the chances that at some
point in the future you will not have enough financial resources to meet your needs?”. Figure
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4 shows the distribution of changes in financial insecurity reported by individuals between
waves 1 and 3 for the three different education groups. There is a peak at no change for all
three education groups - with no evident differences in the location between groups. Linear
regressions of these changes on education dummies and dummies for numerical ability reveal
no (even marginal) statistically significant differences between groups. We take this as sug-
gestive evidence that there were not substantial differential shocks across education groups
over our data period.
Figure 4: Variation in financial insecurity by education level.
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Note: This the change (between waves 1 and 3 of ELSA) in the percentage answers given
to the following question: “What are the chances that at some point in the future you will
not have enough financial resources to meet your needs?”.
As a fifth check, it is useful to assess, to the extent that we can with our short panel,
whether the relationship between education and the discount rate is also found using con-
sumption transitions between time periods other than those we have focussed on above. The
results described in the previous section are generated using differences in consumption be-
tween the period 2002-2004 (between waves 1 and 2 of ELSA) and the period 2004-2006
(between waves 2 and 3 of ELSA). We have also estimated discount rates using the change in
consumption between this second period and 2006-2008 (the period between waves 3 and 4
of ELSA). These results are shown in Table 8, alongside our baseline results. The differences
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in patience between the most and least educated group are larger in the case of the latter
pair of years, though there is little difference over that period between the estimated discount
rates between the lower two education groups.
Table 8: Mean ex-ante discount rate between two different set of years
2002/04-2004/06 2004/06-2006/08
Education ρ¯ σ ρ¯ σ
Low -2.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Mid. 0.8 1.4 -0.2 1.3
High 6.7 3.0 12.4 2.5
All -0.9 0.6 2.0 0.6
A sixth check that we make is whether increases in housing wealth (that were perhaps
unanticipated) over the period we consider could explain the greater growth in consumption
among the more educated. We investigate this by running a median regression of the ‘ex-
post’ discount rate on education dummies and a variable that gives the increase in housing
wealth between the first and third waves of ELSA (2002 and 2006) as a proportion of initial
wealth. The results are given in Table 9. Column (1) shows the results of a median regression
on education dummies for our full sample. Column (2) shows the results of this regression
applied to the 65% of our sample who own their own property. Column (3) adds to this the
increase in housing wealth as a proportion of total wealth. This coefficient is insignificant
and the other coefficients barely change. We interpret this as evidence that changes in house
prices and their effect on consumption do not explain our results.
Table 9: Discount rates and housing price growth
(1) (2) (3)
Mid Education 1.33 -0.04 -0.06
High Education 9.62*** 9.87** 9.87**
Housing wealth effect -0.02
Constant -3.16*** -3.41* -3.42*
Observations 1,503 986 986
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As a final comment we acknowledge the role that measurement error could play in our
results. Note that classical measurement error, for example with a constant variance er-
ror that is multiplicative with consumption, will affect the level of the estimated discount
rates but not affect the relative position of the groups. One needs a non standard type of
measurement error (for instance multiplicative with higher variance among those with more
education relative to those with less) to undo our results.
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6 Conclusion
This paper puts forward a method for estimating individual discount rates using field data.
We build consumption panel data from the intertemporal budget constraint and panel data
on income and wealth. This household-level panel data is used, with the Euler equation, to
estimate discount rates for groups defined by socio-economic characteristics.
We show, unsurprisingly, that there is substantial heterogeneity in discounting in our
sample which is drawn from a population of older households. But surprisingly we find that,
among this older population, households with less education and lower numerical ability
exhibit greater patience than, respectively, those with more education and greater numerical
ability. This result, which is robust to differential housing wealth shocks, differential mortality
and differential incidence of liquidity constraints is somewhat puzzling as it is the opposite
to that found in investigations of time preference for younger households.
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Appendix
This appendix gives additional detail on the data that we use, our method for calculating
consumption and the derivation of the sampling weights that we use. Section A presents
statistics on the measures of wealth, education and numeracy in ELSA. Section B details the
procedure by which we computed consumption from our panel data on wealth and income.
Section C presents additional comparisons of our estimates of consumption from ELSA data
with the consumption data available in EFS. Section D presents the characteristics of the
final sample and, addressing concerns about our use of a non-random sub-sample of the
population, discusses the construction of survey weights.
A.1 Data
The data we utilise in this paper is the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).
ELSA is a biennial longitudinal survey of a representative sample of the English household
population aged 50 and over (plus their partners). The first wave was conducted between
April 2002 and March 2003 and sampled 12,099 individuals (of whom 11,391 were core
sample members; the remainder were individuals aged under 50 who were the partners of
core sample members). There are 7,894 benefit units (i.e. a single person or couple along
with any dependent children) containing a sample member. Our sample is drawn from these
benefit units.
ELSA collects a wide range of information on individuals’ circumstances. This includes
detailed measures of their financial situation: income from all sources (including earnings,
self-employment income, benefits and pensions), non-pension wealth (including the type and
amount of financial assets, property, business assets and antiques) and private pension wealth
(including information on past contributions and details of current scheme rules). ELSA also
collects information on individuals’ physical and mental health, cognitive ability, social par-
ticipation and expectations of future events (such as surviving to some older age or receiving
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an inheritance).
A.1.1 Data on household wealth
Given the importance of the wealth measure for our estimation, it is worth detailing how it
is measured in the survey. ELSA respondents are asked for details on 16 different financial
asset and (non-mortgage) debt instruments.9 For each asset (X), the ‘main respondent’ in
each benefit unit is asked: “How much do you/you and your husband/wife/partner currently
have in X?”. If the respondent doesn’t know or refuses to say, a series of questions is asked
that attempts to put lower and upper bounds on these assets. An imputation procedure is
then carried out that gives a point estimate for the asset level for these individuals10.
Table 10 summaries the holdings in each of these assets. Some are self-explanatory (e.g.
cash savings), others are specific to the UK and deserve some comment. Cash ISAs (Individ-
ual Savings Account) and TESSAs (Tax-Exempt Special Savings Account) are tax efficient
cash savings which are subject to annual limits on what can be paid in. Stocks and shares
ISAs and Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) are stocks and shares held in a tax-efficient ISA (In-
dividual Savings Account) and are also subject to annual limits on what can be paid in. Life
insurance savings ISA are life insurance savings held in a tax-efficient vehicle. Bonds could be
either savings bonds (with retail banks) or government/corporate bonds. According to the
ONS (2009) (Table 4.1) fewer than 2% of households directly hold government or corporate
bonds while over 8% hold fixed-term bonds with financial institutions. Therefore households
in ELSA who report holdings of ‘bonds’ are more likely to be holding savings bonds (which
are effectively fixed-term risk free savings accounts) than gilts or corporate bonds. National
savings are cash savings held in the a government-owned agency (‘National Savings and In-
vestment’). Finally, premium bonds are also issued by the government. Instead of yielding
9There are also questions on housing wealth, physical wealth and pension wealth.
10This imputation procedure, carried out by the ELSA team is called a conditional hot-deck. Given that
we know the, say, cash holdings of a particular household are between £a and £b – that individual is assigned
a random draw from the empirical asset distribution of those who report their assets exactly as between £a
and £b and have the same characteristics along some dimensions: here it is age and household composition.
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interest, the holders of these bonds are included in a monthly draw for large cash prizes.
Table 10: Holdings of different financial assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset Mean Mean Med Proportion Mean Prop.
(Uncond.) (Cond.) (Cond.) with asset port. share unimp.
Cash Savings 12,111 13,474 4,000 90.1% 54.9% 80.4%
Cash ISAs 2,436 7,452 6,000 34.1% 10.0% 91.6%
TESSAs 1,457 9,796 9,000 16.7% 3.5% 95.3%
National savings 832 11,547 3,000 9.2% 1.8% 96.6%
Premium bonds 763 2,373 100 33.6% 2.6% 95.7%
Bonds 2,837 29,425 16,000 11.6% 3.6% 95.2%
Shares 6,650 22,087 3,500 31.6% 7.5% 88.8%
S&S ISAs 1,551 11,982 7,000 14.8% 2.9% 92.3%
PEPs 2,792 18,158 9,000 17.2% 3.7% 93.1%
Invest. trusts 2,379 26,483 12,000 10.9% 2.5% 94.8%
Life ins. savings 2,267 22,470 10,000 12.0% 4.5% 93.2%
Life ins. ISAs 91 9,974 2,000 3.0% 0.2% 95.4%
Other savings 2,179 40,458 15,000 7.4% 2.4% 96.9%
Total 38,346 41,258 12,152 93.1% 100.0% 64.7%
Notes: Column (1): mean holdings in the asset, unconditional on having a positive holding (in GBP); column
(2): mean holdings in the asset, conditional on having a positive holding; column (3): median holdings in
the asset, conditional on having a positive holding; column (4): the proportion benefit units that holds this
asset; column (5): the mean portfolio share (among those with positive total gross assets); column (6): the
proportion of benefit units who report their exact holdings and so for whom no imputation is necessary.
Sources: ELSA, wave 1 (2002/03).
The ELSA survey asks also for details on three different types of non-mortgage debt.
These are credit card debt, private debt (i.e. debts to friends and family) and ‘other debt’
(primarily overdrafts and personal loans). Table 11 summarises the holdings of different debt
instruments and has a form similar to Table 10.
A.1.2 Data on education and numerical ability
We outline here how our measures of education and numerical ability are defined.
We categorise individuals into one of three education groups on the basis of the highest
qualification that they have. We consider those who have a third-level degree or higher to
36
Table 11: Balances of different debts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Debt type Mean Mean Med Proportion Mean Prop.
(Uncond.) (Cond.) (Cond.) with ass. port. share uinimp.
Credit card debt 369 1,989 800 20.3% 41.1% 98.8%
Private debt 68 5,612 1,000 3.3% 2.8% 99.3%
Other debt 846 3,904 1,500 23.3% 56.1% 98.9%
Total 1,293 4,067 1,400 31.8% 100.0% 97.1%
Notes: See notes to Table 10.
Sources: ELSA, wave 1 (2002/03).
have a ‘high’ level of education. Those who have A-levels (British school-leaving exams,
taken at age 18) or equivalent but no university degree are in the ‘mid’ education group. All
others are in the ‘low’ group. Our measure of consumption, and therefore our estimates of
discount rates, are at the household (formally benefit unit11) level. We need an education
measure, therefore, at the household level. We take the education of a household containing
a couple to be the greater of the two levels of education held by the adults in that couple.
Numerical ability is measured in ELSA using a series of six questions, which are repro-
duced in Box 1. The simplest of these questions requires the respondent to solve a very simple
exercise in subtraction while the most difficult requires the respondent to solve a problem
involving compound interest. We divide all individuals into one of four groups following the
categorisation in Banks et al. (2010). Mirroring our approach with respect to education we
take the numerical ability of a household containing a couple to be the greater of the two
levels of numerical ability held by the two members of that couple.
11A benefit unit is a single adult or couple along with any dependent children that they have. Relatively
few members of our sample have dependent children, so our results can be thought of as representing single
adults and couples.
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Box 1 Numerical Ability in ELSA
1. If you buy a drink for 85 pence and pay with a one pound coin, how much
change should you get?
2. In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale a sofa costs
£300. How much will it cost in the sale?
3. If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000
would be expect to get the disease?
4. A second hand car dealer is selling a car for £6,000. This is two-thirds of what
it cost new. How much did the car cost new?
5. If 5 people all have the winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is £2
million, how much will each of them get?
6. Let’s say you have £200 in a savings account. The account earns ten per cent
interest per year. How much will you have in the account at the end of two years?
A.2 Computing consumption
In this subsection we present some additional details on the consumption calculation proce-
dure. We reproduce equation (8) here, which makes clear the data requirements:
ptct = et + tt +
∑
j
(
qjt +
pjt+1 − pjt
pjt
)
pjtX
j
t +
∑
j
(
pjtX
j
t − pjt+1Xjt+1
)
(10)
Three issues that we now discuss in turn are:
1. How to estimate capital gains on assets held between the two waves
(pjt+1−pjt
pjt
)
2. How to estimate income and transfers for the first half of the period between waves.
This is necessary as ELSA sample members are surveyed approximately every two years
with the questionnaire seeking, in most cases, data on receipts in the past year, rather
than on over the entire period between waves
3. Whether to make adjustments to the procedure when asset stocks in either wave are
imputed
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A.2.1 Estimating capital gains
We need to estimate capital gains on assets held between two waves
(pjt+1−pjt
pjt
)
. Depending
on the type of asset we make different assumptions.
i. For cash or most cash-like assets (savings, TESSAs, National savings, Prize bonds) and
‘other savings’, we assume no capital gain
(pjt+1−pjt
pjt
= 0
)
.
ii. For Cash ISAs and Bonds12, we ave a concern that some respondents, for whom their
interest income is simply being rolled up in their account and not withdrawn, will report
that their ‘income’ is zero, when in fact it is positive but simply saved. If income from the
asset is reported as positive, we assume that there is no change in the value of the asset.
If, however, individuals report zero income from their holdings (and approximately 39%
of bondholders do in wave 1), we assume that they are, in fact, receiving interest and that
this interest is simply accumulating in their account and they don’t as a result consider
it as ‘income’. We assume that they earn a rate of return equal to the median rate of
return for those holding similar assets who do report income and reflect this interest in
an increase in the ‘value’ of the asset. That is, for individuals who hold the particular
asset but who report no income, we assume that, if the median return on that asset in
that wave was 2% then
pjt+1−pjt
pjt
= (1.02)τ − 1, where τ ≈ 2 is the length of time in years
between the two interviews.
iii. For equities and equity-like assets, we make a distinction whether the income from the
asset is reported as positive or zero. If income is reported as positive, we assume that
the value of the asset increased in line with the FTSE 100 price index (which excludes
dividend payments) between the dates of the two interviews. If income is reported as
zero, we assume that the value of the asset increased in line with the FTSE 100 total
return index (i.e including dividend payments) between the dates of the two interviews.
12These are largely bank savings bonds (i.e. effectively fixed term savings accounts) rather than government
or corporate bonds.
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iv. For debt, we assume that the interest rate on credit card debt is 15%, the interest rate
on ‘other debt’ (mostly overdrafts) is 8% and that there is a 0% interest rate on ‘private
debt’.
A.2.2 Imputing missing income
For each month between the waves where we don’t have income data, we interpolate linearly
between the two income observations that we have. We carry out this procedure separately
for each category of income (employment income, self-employment income, private pension
income, state pension income, benefit income, asset income and other income).
We vary the procedure in two cases. The first of these is when respondents do not report
some category of their income exactly in one (but not both) of the waves (i.e. they perhaps
only give bounds). In these cases we assume that income has been equal over the period to
the value in the year for which we have full information. The second case where we vary
the procedure is when it comes to state pension income. Here we use the data on the age
of the respondents and the state pension age to establish when their state pension payments
started.
A.2.3 Whether to make adjustments to the procedure when asset stocks in either
wave are imputed
In a number of cases survey respondents don’t know the exact amount of some asset holding
or some income component. In that case the ELSA questionnaire attempts to obtain bounds
on the unknown amounts and the survey data is published with imputed amounts that lie
between these bounds.
When individuals report that they do not know exactly their holdings in any particular
wave t or t+ 1 (i.e. they don’t know Xjt or X
j
t+1 for some j), we make the assumption that
they made no payments into or withdrawals from their assets – i.e. Xjt −Xjt+1 = 0.
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A.3 Comparisons of consumption measures between EFS and ELSA
Figures 5, 6 and 7 probe the comparison between the distribution of consumption in the EFS
and in ELSA more deeply than in the body of the paper. The figures each take a particular
household characteristic (age, education and marital status respectively) and compare the
conditional distributions of consumption in both surveys. We show the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles as well as the mean. Of interest are both the difference between quantiles
for a households of a particular type (for example, whether the shape and location of the
distributions match for young people) and the differences for a particular quantile across
household types (for example, whether the relationship between median expenditure and age
is similar in both surveys).
These figures show that many of the points we made above in our comparison of the
unconditional distributions of consumption between surveys are true for the distributions
conditional on (at least these) household characteristics. For all age groups, for those with
middle and higher levels of education and for all marital statuses, the 75th percentile of
consumption is higher in ELSA than in the EFS, and in most cases the median and mean
are higher too, with smaller differences to be seen between the 25th percentiles in each
survey. The socio-economic gradients observed in the EFS are closely replicated in the
ELSA consumption data – that is consumption decreases with age, rises with education and
married households consume more than single households (unsurprisingly as our measure of
consumption here is not adjusted using an equivalence scale).
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Figure 5: Comparing consumption in EFS and ELSA – by age – 2003.
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Figure 6: Comparing consumption in EFS and ELSA – by education – 2003.
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Notes: Those who have a third-level degree or higher are classified as ‘high’ level of education; those who
have A-levels (British school-leaving exams, taken at age 18) or equivalent but no university degree are in
the ‘mid’ education group. All others are in the ‘low’ group.
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Figure 7: Comparing consumption in EFS and ELSA – by marital status – 2003.
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Notes: The labels on the horizontal axis mean as follows: M. – Married (including cohabitating); S. – Single,
never married; W. – Widowed; D. – Divorced/Separated.
As a final comparison of our generated data on consumption with that in the EFS we
make use of the fact that data on food spending is recorded in ELSA. In Figure 8 we plot
the relationship between food spending and total spending in both surveys (again trimming
the bottom and top 10% of consumption). The relationships shown are estimated using
locally-weighted regressions. Food spending is estimated as greater in ELSA than in the
EFS13; the slope of the relationship between it and total spending is, however, similar in
both surveys from the point at which total consumption is equal to approximately £10,000.
Below this level, food spending in ELSA doesn’t vary much with our calculated measure of
total consumption – an indication, perhaps, that some of the households in the left-tail of
the distribution of consumption are there due to measurement error.
13One potential reason for this is the different methods by which the data on food spending is gathered.
The ELSA data is taken from respondents’ responses to a question that asks how much they spend on food
in a typical month. The EFS data is taken from respondents’ spending diary entries.
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Figure 8: Comparison of relationship between food spending and consumption in EFS and
ELSA – 2003.
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A.4. Selection and composition of sub-sample
To balance considerations of maintaining as large a sample as is possible and of using as little
inaccurate data as is possible, we exclude observations where we feel the data did not allow
us to estimate consumption. We provide here details on how our sample was selected (D.1)
and then we describe the selected sample and the construction of weights used to correct for
our use of a non-representative sample in (D.2).
A.4.1 Selection of the sample
We exclude benefit units from the our estimating sub-sample if any of the following conditions
hold.
1. If at least one component of income is not known up to a closed interval in both waves
t and t+ 1.
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2. If a ‘large’ change in physical wealth was observed between the two waves. Changes
in the financial asset values that we observe could then be the result of transferring
asset holdings between types of assets rather than being indicative of consumption.
We define a large change in ‘physical assets’ as occurring when there has both been a
change in the value of holdings of at least £2,000 and a proportionate change in the
value of the portfolio of at least 30%
3. If a ‘large’ change in uncategorised wealth was observed between the two waves. A
small number of couples keep their finances largely separate. When these individuals
are asked for any asset holdings that they hold jointly, only the total level of jointly-held
asset is sought - not the level of holdings of particular assets. Estimating the capital
gain between waves is thus not possible. A large change is the value of joint holdings is
considered to have occurred when there has both been a change in the value of holdings
of at least £2,000 and a proportionate change in the portfolio of at least 30%
4. If an individual bought or sold a house between the waves
5. If mortgage payments are missing
6. If some critical piece of data is missing (usually education or age), the imputation
procedure used by the ELSA team to fill in missing income and asset holdings is not
possible
7. If the benefit unit composition changed between the two waves
8. If the either partner in a couple does not respond to the survey
9. If a lump-sum payment has been received in the past year and we do not observe the
exact amount
10. If either member of a benefit unit suffered the bereavement of their last remaining living
parent between waves (and thus may have received an inheritance that we might not
observe if was received over a year before the ELSA interview)
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Table 12 summarises the selection operated by our procedure from the initial sample.
We need two successive observations on assets to compute consumption – therefore the left
panel shows the proportions for whom we have a successful consumption calculation as a
proportion of the 6,022 benefit units who make up the balanced panel for waves 1 and 2 (the
panel on the right of the table shows these proportions out of all those observed in wave 1.
The rules we have established above lead us to exclude 38% of the balanced panel. For an
additional 2.3% of the sample, we estimate negative consumption level, indicative of a failure
to impute consumption.
Table 12: Success rate of consumption calculation
Proportions of Proportions of
balanced panel wave 1 sample
Computation status Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage
Have consumption 3,541 58.8% 3,541 44.8%
Calculation failed 2,298 38.2% 2,298 29.1%
Negative consumption 183 3.0% 183 2.3%
Attrited - - 1,872 23.7%
Total 6,022 100.0 7,894 100.0%
Table 13 summarises the proportions of benefit units in the balanced panel where a
particular reason for the consumption calculation being unsuccessful is relevant.
Table 13: Summary of reasons for consumption calculation failing
Reasons Percentage
Missing income component 760 12.6
Large change in physical wealth 721 12.0
Large change in uncategorised wealth 85 1.4
Bought or sold property 321 5.3
Mortgage payments missing 48 0.8
Critical information missing 181 3.0
Benefit Unit composition changed 145 2.4
Non-responding partner 416 6.9
Missing data on lump-sum receipt 141 2.3
Last surviving parent died 352 5.9
We described above how we deal with cases where some component of assets or income is
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not known exactly and have had to be imputed. Where assets aren’t known in either wave
we assume that there has been no flow in or out between waves. We thus do not use the
imputed data on assets. We do, on the other hand, use the imputed data on income, but
exclude benefit units where at least one component of income is not known up to a closed
interval in both waves t and t+ 1. We have assessed if (and confirmed that) our results hold
if we apply stricter sample selection rules with respect to the use of imputed data. The third
and fourth panels in Table 6 for example, show the estimated discount rates with successively
stricter sample selection rules than applied in the baseline (in the text of the paper we have
referred to these as our ‘middle’ and ‘strict’ sample selection rules). These rules are as follows:
• Middle: Do not include individuals when the value of some asset holding in wave t is
not known at least up to a closed interval. Do not include individuals where at least
one component of income is not reported exactly in both waves t and t+ 1.
• Strict: Do not include individuals when the value of some asset holding in wave t is not
reported exactly. Do not include individuals where at least one component of income
in wave t is not reported exactly in either wave t or t+ 1.
The foregoing tables and discussion detail the extent to which we have been able to
calculate consumption. To estimate a discount rate we need, of course, at least two successive
observations on consumption (and therefore three successive observations in the data). There
are 4,886 benefit units in the balanced panel of the first three waves of data. Of these we
can include 1,578 (32%) of these in our estimating sub-sample. We exclude benefit units
where the consumption calculation failed between either pair of waves (1 and 2 or 2 and 3),
where calculated consumption is less than £3,000 in either case or where the benefit unit
composition or labour supply activity of either member changed. Table 14 shows the number
(and proportion) of cases in which these conditions are relevant.
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Table 14: Summary of reasons for consumption calculation failing
Reasons Percentage
Consumption calculation failed between either pair of waves 2,532 51.8
Consumption less than £3000 between either pair of waves 780 16.0
Benefit unit composition changed 1,103 22.6
Labour supply changed 690 14.1
A.4.2 Characteristics of the selected sample
With a successful calculation of consumption for approximately 60% of the balanced (wave
1 and 2) panel, and the inclusion in the estimating sub-sample of approximately 32% of the
balanced (waves 1 to 3) panel, there might be some concern about the representativeness
of the sample. In this section we describe the dimensions along which these samples are
non-random.
Table 15 contains a multivariate analysis of the probability of our having successfully
calculated consumption (the left hand panel) and the probability of being in our discount
rate estimating sub-sample (the right hand panel). Each panel contains the results from the
two logistic regressions – the first where the sample is all those benefit units observed in wave
1, the second where the sample is the relevant balanced panel.
The dependent variables include dummies for age, marital status, education, quintiles
of equivilised income and quintiles of wealth (odd ratios are presented). For couple, age is
taken as the age of the male. The only other variable included in the analysis which requires
some explanation is education. We categorise individuals as having one of three levels of
education: low, middle and high. Those in the ‘low’ group either have no formal academic or
vocational qualifications or have a Certificate of Secondary Education, those in the ‘middle’
group have A-levels or O-Levels and those in the ‘high’ group have a higher-level degree. Some
individuals have qualifications which don’t fit neatly into one of these categories (because for
example, they have foreign qualifications or have some higher level education below degree).
We place these individuals in the low, middle and high education group respectively if they
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left full-time education at or before the age of 16, at 17 or 18, or at or later than 19.
The sub-samples that we use are indeed non-random samples from the entire ELSA sample
– with an under-representation of younger benefit units, married benefit units and benefit
units with more education. To account for this, we weight the observations in each empirical
exercise. The weights are equal the product of the ELSA survey weights and the inverse of
the probability of being included in the estimating subsample. This probability is estimated
using the logistic regressions on the entire wave 1 subsample.
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Table 15: Logit regression of successfully calculating consumption on sample on characteris-
tics
Probability of being in Probability of being in
consumption sample discount rate sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 50 to 54 (omm.)
Age 55 to 59 0.98 1.12 0.94 0.99
Age 60 to 64 1.00 1.11 0.99 1.07
Age 65 to 69 1.15 1.31*** 1.77*** 2.07***
Age 70 to 74 1.30*** 1.69*** 1.95*** 2.56***
Age 75 to 79 1.21* 1.88*** 1.66*** 2.56***
Age 80 to 84 0.95 1.70*** 1.35** 2.48***
Age 85 or over 0.59*** 1.82*** 0.76 2.44***
Single (omm.)
Married 0.81** 0.77** 0.77** 0.83
Widowed 1.30*** 1.12 1.10 0.88
Separated 1.29** 1.24 1.33** 1.29
Low Educ. (omm.)
Mid. Educ. 1.15** 0.98 1.14 0.94
High. Educ. 1.03 0.89 0.96 0.80*
Inc. quint. 1 (omm.)
Inc. quint. 2 1.01 0.94 0.94 1.00
Inc. quint. 3 1.09 0.97 0.90 0.83*
Inc. quint. 4 1.05 1.00 0.87 0.86
Inc. quint. 5 1.01 0.92 0.66*** 0.61***
Wealth quint. 1 (omm.)
Wealth quint. 2 0.83** 0.45*** 0.71*** 0.49***
Wealth quint. 3 0.72*** 0.33*** 0.57*** 0.33***
Wealth quint. 4 0.56*** 0.22*** 0.41*** 0.22***
Wealth quint. 5 0.35*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.11***
Observations 7,253 5,476 7,253 4,439
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In specifications (1) and (2) the sample is all those sampled in wave 1, regardless of whether they
attrited by wave 2 or not. In specification (3) the sample is the balanced (wave 1 and 2) panel. In specification
(4) the sample is the balanced (waves 1, 2 and 3) panel
51
